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Abstract 
This article uses statistical data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the South 
African Opinion Leader Survey to examine liberal values and attitudes among the 
following samples of South Africans: Afrikaans, English, isiXhosa and isiZulu 
speaking Protestants, Catholics, African Independent Church (AIC) members and 
non-religious people (public and parliamentarians). We find that South Africans 
have softened in their traditionally conservative attitudes toward homosexuality, 
prostitution, abortion and euthanasia (but not the death penalty). We conclude that 
the South African public has gradually become more accepting of the liberal values 
of the constitution (the product of elite-driven transition to liberal democracy). That 
being said, South Africans have not become liberals as such and many mainline 
Protestants and members of the AICs (in particular) have remained fairly con-
servative in their views. Additionally, elites (parliamentarians) continue to outpace 
the public with regards to the acceptance of liberal values and practices. 
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Introduction 
In a previous article (Christian Ethics in South Africa: Religiosity among the Public and 
Elites, Kotzé & Loubser, 2017) an overview was provided of the nature and extent of 
religiosity among various Christian groups and non-religious people in South Africa. The 
present article offers an investigation into the extent to which the liberal values found in 
South Africa’s constitution have been accepted among the same groups of people. The 
groups in question are Protestants, Roman Catholics, members of the African Independent 
Churches (AICs) and non-religious people. For a more detailed analysis, these groups are 
also subdivided into four language groups: mother tongue speakers of Afrikaans, English, 
isiXhosa and isiZulu. Wherever possible, the values of the public are compared with that of 
South African parliamentary leaders. 
Post-Apartheid South Africa’s constitution grants equal rights to all the country’s 
citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religious affiliation or sexual orientation (see 
Chapter 2 of Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996:6-9). In practice, this has 
resulted in a series of laws that have been controversial and unpopular with the South 
African public. South Africa was one of the first countries to legalise same-sex marriage in 
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2006 despite a hostile reaction from a fairly conservative public (Thoreson, 2008; Roberts 
and Reddy, 2008:9-11). The acceptance of gay people as equal citizens and the practice of 
same-sex marriage have continued to be debated heatedly, as illustrated by the controversy 
and criticism provoked by the Dutch Reformed Church’s decision in 2015 to admit gay 
members and allow them to marry in the church. This decision was under threat from the 
beginning and when in November 2016 the General Synod of the DRC reversed this 
decision, this reversal was challenged in the High Court in Pretoria. (Oosthuizen, 2015; Die 
Burger, 16 June 2017).  The idea of gay marriage has also proved unpalatable to other 
churches in the country, including the Anglican Church (Laganparsad, 2016:5) and the 
Roman Catholic Church, both of whom criticised the initial more liberal 2015 decision of 
the Dutch Reformed Church (DeBarros, 2015). 
Gay rights are not the only controversial moral issue where the liberal values of the 
constitution clash with the views of the public. The legalisation of abortion – in the name of 
women’s rights – has also been unpopular with many South Africans (Mncwango & Rule, 
2008:6-7). The passing of the Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act in 1996 provoked 
resistance even among many members of parliament, including members of the ruling 
African National Congress (ANC) who initiated the legislation under President Nelson 
Mandela (Guttmacher et al., 1998:193). There continues to be passionate disagreement 
about abortion in many sectors of South African society (Hodes, 2013; Rule, 2004:4-5). 
Meanwhile, advocacy groups such as SWEAT (Sex workers Educate and Advocacy Task 
Force) and the pro-euthanasia advocacy groups such as Dying with Dignity SA, amongst 
others are continuously lobbying the SA government to change the legislation regarding sex 
work and euthanasia.
3
   
South African sentiments about capital punishment have been similarly contrarian. A 
feature of Apartheid era justice (and injustice), the death penalty was found to be 
unconstitutional in 1995 since it violates the rights to dignity and life (Plasket, 2006:9). The 
idea of capital punishment has nevertheless enjoyed a recurring popularity with many South 
Africans, who have been known to demand its return (Spies, 2015; Mkhondo, 2014; Nduru, 
2006). 
The three moral issues mentioned above – homosexuality, abortion and capital punish-
ment – are arguably the biggest and most enduring of heated debates on values in South 
Africa. The country’s political elites have, however, decided the matter for the public by 
drawing up an extremely progressive constitution, which ultimately allows the unpopular 
rights and restraints discussed above. This article examines what South Africans of various 
backgrounds (mentioned above) believe about these controversial matters in the time period 
2006 to 2013 (the latter being the latest extensive data available).  
In addition to South Africans’ views on homosexuality, abortion and the death penalty, 
there is also an examination of the attitudes regarding prostitution and euthanasia. Neither 
have been legalised in South Africa despite debates and lobbying with regards to both (see, 
for example, Surujlal, J & Dhurup, M, 2009; Bateman, 2015:432-433; Slabbert & Van der 
Westhuizen, 2007:383-384). It is therefore important to analyse South Africans’ attitudes 
regarding these moral dilemmas, with an eye to the future. 
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Data and Samples 
As was the case with the first article, the World Values Survey (WVS) data (dating from 
2006 and 2013) is used for statistical analysis of public beliefs and attitudes. 2 988 South 
Africans over the age of 16 were interviewed during the 2006 survey, while the 2013 
survey included 3 531 respondents. The datasets in question are weighted to accurately 
reflect demographics and are also within a statistical margin of error of less than 2% at the 
95% confidence level. 
The South African Opinion Leader Survey (from 2007 and 2013) is used to analyse the 
values of South Africa’s foremost opinion leaders in parliament. The former includes 
answers from 100 members of parliament and the latter 142.
4
 The surveys discussed above 
are administered under the auspices of the Centre for International and Comparative 
Politics (CICP) at Stellenbosch University. They are well-established, reputable 
longitudinal studies that have been conducted at regular intervals since 1981 (WVS) and 
1990 (Opinion Leader Survey) respectively. The WVS is nationally representative and the 
results can be used to generalise about the South African public. The Opinion Leader 
Survey, however, is only indicative of the attitudes of some members of parliament and 
results from this data cannot be used to make generalisations about the South African 
public or elites as such.  
This article studies South Africa’s Christian communities and compares three categories 
of Christians with people who claim to have no religious denomination (described as non-
religious for the purpose of this article). The different Christian denominations under 
investigation are Protestants, Roman Catholics and members of the African Independent 
Churches (AICs).
5
 These three denominations are the biggest religious communities in 
South Africa (where Christianity is also the dominant religion) (South African Institute of 
Race Relations, 2015:69). Other religions and denominations do not form part of this 
particular study and have therefore been excluded from all analyses.  
To provide further insight into various South African beliefs, values and attitudes, four 
language groups have also been selected for closer analysis. These are the Afrikaans and 
English speaking communities (both being ethnically heterogeneous) as well as mother 
tongue speakers of isiXhosa and isiZulu (both being fairly ethnically homogenous). These 
are the four biggest language groups in the country,
6
 which is the basis for their inclusion in 
the study.
7
 
The reader is kindly asked to keep the following in mind when assessing the findings: 
firstly, the general data on Protestants, Roman Catholics etc. includes all Protestant and 
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Catholic etc. respondents, regardless of which language they speak. It is only the deeper 
analysis of language group and religion that excludes speakers of other languages; 
secondly, care is to be taken not to confuse language groups with ethnic groups: mother 
tongue Afrikaans and English speakers are not necessarily ethnic Afrikaners or people of 
English descent. The same may hold true for isiXhosa and isiZulu respondents, although 
language and ethnicity tend to overlap for the latter two groups; lastly, the sample sizes of 
the elites – with the exception of the Protestant elites – are quite small and this may skew 
the results (hence the occasional 100% agreement to a statement or question). The small 
sample sizes are a limitation, but the data at hand nevertheless remains the best and only 
source with which to learn anything about the groups in question. 
 
Liberal Values 
Before turning to the analysis of religion, language and liberal values, it is important briefly 
to note the nature of the samples in question in terms of the composition of the different 
religious groups. The subject is discussed in detail in Kotzé & Loubser (2017).  Only the 
main figures are recapped in Tables 1 and 2. Do note the dramatic decrease in the 
proportional number of Protestants among the public. 
 
Table 1. Proportional size of       Table 2. Proportional size  
religious groups (public)       of religious groups (elites) 
 
Religious Denomination 2006 2013    Religious Denomination 2007 2013 
Protestant 
Roman Catholic 
IACs 
Non-Religious 
39% 
16% 
23% 
22% 
22% 
25% 
26% 
27% 
   Protestant 
Roman Catholic 
Non-Mainline Christians 
Non-Religious 
65% 
12% 
N/A 
23% 
77% 
10% 
N/A 
14% 
Total 100% 100%    Total 100% 100% 
 
To measure attitudes towards the controversial moral questions under investigation, 
respondents in all the datasets were asked whether homosexuality, prostitution and so forth 
are ever justifiable.
8
 Table 3 provides a comprehensive overview of the beliefs and attitudes 
of the public and elites regarding the values in question. A few main conclusions can be 
drawn: over the period 2006 to 2013 all the people in the study have grown more liberal 
with regards to every moral issue under investigation, with the single exception of the death 
penalty; secondly, despite everyone's becoming more liberal, in almost all cases the public 
has proven more conservative in their views than their leaders; another interesting finding 
is that Protestants tend to be more conservative in their views than others. This tends to be 
the case for both the public and elites. It should however be kept in mind that the majority 
of the elites are Protestant and the sample sizes of the other groups are consequently very 
small, which may skew the results.
9
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Table 3. Are the following ever justifiable? 
 
 
 
A deeper analysis according to language is provided in Table 4. It shows only the 
proportion of respondents who said that a given practice was never justifiable. Once again 
one finds that, in general, Protestants tend to be the most conservative group in the sample. 
In fact, they appear to have grown more conservative in many instances. In many cases AIC 
Christians also report fairly conservative views (even when these views are less conser-
vative than they used to be). Among AIC members, isiZulu speakers – and sometimes also 
English speakers – stand out as being fairly liberal. By far the most liberal group of all is 
the category of English speaking non-religious people. 
There appears to have been a remarkable shift in attitude towards homosexuality: it has 
become much more acceptable amongst almost everyone. It is only Protestants in general 
and Afrikaans-speaking Christians who have not softened on the subject. This probably 
explains the ongoing controversy over gay membership and marriage in the Protestant 
churches. Although the Roman Catholic Church criticised the Dutch Reformed Church’s 
2015 decision to be more accepting of gay people (DeBarros, 2015), its own members have 
in most cases become much more amenable to gay rights. 
A look at the 2013 data on same-sex marriage
10
 confirms that most Protestants (68%) 
and AIC members (55%) are against the idea. However, over half of all Catholics (56%) as 
                                                                                                                                                   
necessarily indicate a significant pattern. Data that is not statistically significant (indicated with an *) is 
therefore not usable. 
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no 2006 data. 
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well as non-religious people (55%) think that same-sex marriage is sometimes or always 
justifiable (data not shown).  
 
Table 4. Percentage of public who think the following are never justifiable 
 
Moral Issue Religious 
Denomi-
nation 
Protestant Roman 
Catholic 
AICs Non-
Religious 
2006 2013 2006 2013 2006 2013 2006 2013 
Homosexuality 
Afrikaans 
English 
Xhosa 
Zulu 
 
68% 
54% 
86% 
74% 
 
67% 
70% 
86% 
81% 
 
51% 
68% 
89% 
67% 
 
65% 
44% 
36% 
45% 
 
100% 
100% 
76% 
85% 
 
85% 
48% 
74% 
58% 
 
66% 
57% 
88% 
73% 
 
52% 
20% 
59% 
46% 
Prostitution 
Afrikaans 
English 
Xhosa 
Zulu 
 
83% 
78% 
92% 
80% 
 
79% 
87% 
91% 
84% 
 
73% 
77% 
80% 
87% 
 
66% 
43% 
35% 
50% 
 
100% 
100% 
83% 
89% 
 
70% 
63% 
72% 
61% 
 
85% 
80% 
87% 
86% 
 
58% 
25% 
59% 
48% 
Abortion 
Afrikaans 
English 
Xhosa 
Zulu 
 
73% 
65% 
86% 
75% 
 
71% 
83% 
90% 
83% 
 
63% 
74% 
91% 
81% 
 
55% 
47% 
34% 
48% 
 
100% 
100% 
80% 
87% 
 
69% 
70% 
72% 
61% 
 
81% 
68% 
82% 
78% 
 
58% 
25% 
57% 
52% 
Euthanasia 
Afrikaans 
English 
Xhosa 
Zulu 
 
67% 
56% 
78% 
68% 
 
38% 
65% 
90% 
70% 
 
70% 
48% 
83% 
67% 
 
63% 
44% 
32% 
41% 
 
100% 
0% 
78% 
81% 
 
73% 
61% 
71% 
51% 
 
72% 
48% 
74% 
78% 
 
44% 
21% 
52% 
45% 
Death Penalty 
Afrikaans 
English 
Xhosa 
Zulu 
 
25% 
41% 
63% 
61% 
 
26% 
47% 
89% 
73% 
 
37% 
56% 
68% 
62% 
 
55% 
51% 
34% 
46% 
 
100% 
82% 
70% 
57% 
 
66% 
42% 
65% 
52% 
 
43% 
34% 
58% 
60% 
 
37% 
16% 
52% 
47% 
 
Figure 1 shows that the conservative Protestant sentiment is valid for all four language 
groups: over half of each group’s respondents think same-sex marriage is never justifiable. 
AIC Christians are somewhat less conservative and Roman Catholics tend to be the most 
liberal of the Christians, with isiXhosa Catholics being particularly accepting of gay 
marriage. The most liberal group overall is non-religious English speakers, approximately 
78% of whom find same-sex marriage justifiable (and most non-religious people generally 
agree). We found a similar pattern among elites: over half of Protestant elites (59%) are 
against gay marriage compared to 30% of Catholic elites and only 8% of non-religious 
leaders (data not shown). 
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Figure 1. Never justifiable: same-sex marriage 
 
 
 
In addition to the decrease in disapproval of homosexuality, there is a general trend towards 
a more liberal attitude toward other moral and social questions. Prostitution, abortion and 
euthanasia have all become more acceptable in general and to specific groups in particular. 
However, it is important to note that although there appears to be a trend towards more 
liberal attitudes, the levels of acceptance among various groups differ widely on all matters. 
In many cases attitudes have definitely softened, but the higher levels of acceptance (of any 
given issue) are not necessarily high levels of acceptance as such. In many cases attitudes 
are still fairly conservative despite having become markedly less so since 2006. Thus one 
sees that most of the demographic groups in Table 4 still disapprove of everything but the 
death penalty. 
The death penalty is the only moral dilemma where there is not a general trend towards 
a more liberal stance. In fact, the various demographics are divided about evenly in their 
respective stances on capital punishment. Discounting the demographic groups whose 
opinions have remained more or less the same since 2006, there are more strands of society 
growing increasingly in favour of capital punishment than against Table 4. In fact, isiXhosa 
and isiZulu speaking Protestants (and to a lesser extent isiXhosa and Afrikaans speaking 
AIC members) are the only people in the study with truly high levels of rejection for the 
death penalty. Surprisingly, English speaking non-religious people – normally a very liberal 
group – are the most adamantly in favour of capital punishment (only 16% think it is never 
justifiable). It is likely that the continued support for the death penalty in South Africa is 
due to the country’s extremely high levels of crime and violence (Møller, 2005:268; Spies, 
2015). 
 
Factor Analysis and Moral Index 
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
Afrikaans English Xhosa Zulu 
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In order to construct a moral index which would indicate where the South Africans in our 
study can be located on a moral scale, a factor analysis was conducted (varimax rotation) 
on 14 items (all asking respondents about the justifiability of moral issues).
11
 Factor one 
explained 27.812% of the variance and the five items that scored highest on factor one 
(using a fairly high cut-off of .66) were used in the construction of the moral index. These 
variables were: (are the following ever justifiable:) same-sex marriage (.797), suicide 
(.711), homosexuality (.701), abortion (.688) and prostitution (.669). 
The moral index constructed from the five variables above was recoded on a nine point 
scale with 1 indicating ‘never justifiable’ and 9 indicating ‘always justifiable.’ Over half of 
the responses were clustered around values 1-3 on the scale and approximately 60% of the 
variance could be found clustered around values 1-4. Most respondents therefore lean 
towards the disapproving side of the scale (‘never justifiable’). These results merely 
confirm that the South Africans in our study remain quite conservative despite the effect of 
increased liberalism found in Tables 3 and 4 as well as Figure 1. The variance can be 
viewed in more detail in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Moral Index 
 
Moral Scale Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
1 (Never Justifiable) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 (Always Justifiable) 
25 
16.5 
9.6 
8.5 
11.5 
10.4 
7.4 
6.2 
4.8 
25 
41.5 
51.1 
59.6 
71.1 
81.5 
88.9 
95.2 
100 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This analysis of Christian ethics in South Africa found an important change of heart in 
progress: most South Africans have softened in their attitudes toward most of the 
controversial practices under study. This does not mean that South Africa has become a 
nation of liberals, but the changes that have occurred in a relatively short period of time are 
nevertheless remarkable and important. Where values are concerned, South Africa has been 
engaged in a dynamic process of change. Future analysis will reveal whether secularisation 
and liberalisation are set to continue.  
At present it does appear as if – singular exceptions notwithstanding – the South 
African public is slowly being reconciled to the values of its own constitution. The 
constitution has largely been an elite project, initiated and implemented by South African 
leaders, often to an unwilling public. However, the public has not been oblivious to elites’ 
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promotion of liberal values. Ordinary people have begun to grow more accepting of the 
sometimes offensive rights of others. Besides the influence of the value patterns among the 
political elite, we could only speculate why there was this slow but steady movement 
towards a more liberal stance on the moral issues discussed. Foremost is certainly the role 
of the South African Constitution and the respect that the public gained over time for the 
principled stance that the Constitutional Court judges took in their interpretation of 
important sections related to moral issues and others. The general opening up of society for 
debates on these issues and the influencing role of social media and advocacy groups might 
also have played a not insignificant part in this slow change reported in these value 
patterns.   
The changes occurring among Protestant worshippers were another interesting finding. 
South Africa’s Protestant churches appear to have suffered a dramatic exodus of members 
(Kotzé & Loubser, 2017) and the remaining Protestant worshippers have remained 
remarkably conservative in the face of liberal change. If liberal values are the wave of the 
future, the now smaller number of Protestant worshippers appear to be quite resistant. It 
remains to be seen whether Protestant churches will embrace change, either for its own sake 
or in an attempt to win back followers. That being said, a large number of South African 
Christians are now affiliated with non-mainline churches such as the AICs. Respondents 
who belong to the AICs also often appear to be fairly conservative in their outlook.  
The more detailed analysis of language communities added further perspective to the 
findings. Despite the recognition that English speakers have a tendency toward liberal 
attitudes, it is safe to say that there are considerable differences of opinion both between 
and within the various language groups, depending on their particular religious background 
as well as the particular moral dilemma with which they are presented.  
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